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Note
Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive
Rights: Public Health and Reproductive Risks in
a Genomic Age
Luke Haqq*
Until recently, microcephaly was an uncommon condition,
with the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) estimating it typically affects between two and twelve babies per
1
10,000 live births in the United States. The current pandemic
2
emerged in French Polynesia in 2013. By the end of 2014, the
Brazilian government had already initiated an investigation into several thousands of cases of microcephaly, a birth defect
3
that typically affected 150 infants annually in Brazil. The vi* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Susan Wolf, Susanna Blumenthal, Brian Bix, Anna Luczkow, Ian Jackson,
and Dion Farganis for their comments throughout the process of writing this.
Research for this Note was funded in part by a grant from the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) and National Cancer Institute
(NCI) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on “Disclosing Genomic Incidental Findings in a Cancer Biobank: An ELSI Experiment,” grant #1R01CA154517, Gloria Petersen, Ph.D. (Mayo Clinic), Barbara Koenig, Ph.D. (University of California, San Francisco), and Susan M. Wolf, J.D. (University of
Minnesota), Principal Investigators (PIs). All views expressed are those of the
author and not necessarily the views of NHGRI, NCI, or NIH. Copyright ©
2016 by Luke Haqq.
1. Nat’l Birth Defects Prevention Network, Major Birth Defects Data
from Population-Based Birth Defects Surveillance Programs in the United
States, 2006–2010, 97 CLINICAL & MOLECULAR TERATOLOGY S1 (2013); Facts
About Microcephaly, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www
.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/microcephaly.html (last updated July 25, 2016).
2. See Van-Mai Cao-Lormeau et al., Gillain-Barré Syndrome Outbreak
Associated with Zika Virus Infection in French Polynesia: A Case-Control
Study, 387 LANCET 1531 (2016); Erwan Oehler et al., Zika Virus Infection
Complicated by Guillain-Barré Syndrome – Case Report, French Polynesia, December 2013, 19 EUROSURVEILLANCE 1 (2014); Louise Watrin et al. GuillainBarré Syndrome (42 Cases) Occurring During a Zika Virus Outbreak in French
Polynesia, 95 MED. e3257 (2016).
3. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. et al., Short Answers to Hard Questions About
Zika Virus, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/health/what-is-zika-virus.html?_r=0.
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rus threatens to infect as many as four million people globally
4
in 2016, and the World Health Organization and CDC have
declared that there is scientific consensus, not just anecdotal
reports, that the Aedes aegypti mosquito-borne virus causes mi5
6
crocephaly, among other birth defects. The virus has spread
from Oceania to South and North America, with CDC data revealing 2920 laboratory-confirmed, travel-associated cases in
every state but Alaska, South Dakota, and Wyoming, twenty7
four of which were sexually transmitted. On July 4, 2016, “a
patient entered an emergency room in Miami-Dade County
8
with a fever, a rash and joint pain,” the first of forty-three cases confirmed to be transmitted in the United States through lo9
10
cal mosquitoes. Some microcephalics can develop normally.
Some cases may not become apparent until symptoms like seizures develop in childhood, but when the birth defect is pro4. Id.
5. Michaeleen Doucleff, Zika Is Linked to Microcephaly, Health Agencies
Confirm, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/03/31/472607576/health-agencies-confirm-zika-is-linked
-with-microcephaly.
6. A preliminary New England Journal of Medicine report tracked
eighty-eight pregnant women in Rio de Janeiro from September 2015 to February 2016. Patrícia Brasil et al., Zika Virus Infection in Pregnant Women in
Rio de Janeiro—Preliminary Report, NEW ENG. J. MED., Mar. 4, 2016, at 1. Of
these eighty-eight women who had exhibited a rash, eighty-two percent tested
positive for Zika. Id. at 3. The preliminary report concludes that it causes not
only microcephaly but also “appears to be associated with grave outcomes, including fetal death, placental insufficiency, fetal growth restriction, and [central nervous system] injury.” Id. at 1. One Zika expert suggests microcephaly
“may just be the tip of the iceberg” of effects that Zika can have on fetuses.
Lena H. Sun, Zika Expert: ‘Microcephaly May Just Be the Tip of the Iceberg,’
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your
-health/wp/2016/02/09/zika-expert-microcephaly-may-just-be-the-tip-of-the
-iceberg. For example, preliminary evidence has shown pregnant women infected with Zika virus may give birth to babies that are not microcephalic but
do have neurological lesions. Id.
7. Zika Virus: Case Counts in the US, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html.
8. Pam Belluck, Patch of Miami Is Ground Zero for the Zika Virus, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/health/zika-virus
-florida.html?_r=0.
9. Zika Virus: Case Counts in the US, supra note 7.
10. One mother, for example, describes her six-year-old with microcephaly
as “the busiest guy ever . . . . He walks, runs . . . rides bikes, plays soccer, rides
horses, you name it.” Sean’s Story, PMGAWARENESS.ORG (Sept. 9, 2012),
http://pmgawareness.org/seans-story. At the same time, the woman also noted
that, during her pregnancy, she and her husband “were never taken aside and
told what [m]icrocephaly really meant and what it may or may not involve.”
Id.
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nounced, the vast majority born with it die in infancy or child11
hood.
It is only in recent times that parents have had access to
12
robust “reproductive choice information,” including information about mosquito-borne teratogens, environmental toxins,
pharmaceutical side effects, carrier status, and gene variants
13
that could lead to birth defects in future progeny. Developments including ultrasonography, chorionic villus sampling, in
vitro fertilization, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and, per14
haps most importantly, the abortion right further lowered the
rate of birth defects in the United States. In the past decade,
abilities to prevent defects have become even more refined with
the advent of clinical genomic sequencing. Preconception, pre-

11. See, e.g., Yoko Imaizumi, Prevalence and Mortality Rates of Microcephaly in Japan, 1969–1992, 34 CONGENITAL ANOMALIES 131, 131 (1994)
(finding the mean age at time of death for microcephalics rose from three
years in 1969–1971 to thirteen from 1990–1992).
12. “Reproductive choice information,” as used in this Note, is that which
is germane to reproductive autonomy, and is synonymous with results or information of “reproductive significance” or “reproductive importance.” It is not
synonymous with “reproductive health information.” Reproductive choice information guides the deliberations one makes about reproduction generally,
such as whether to use natural family planning, contraception, abortion, and
genetic testing. Further, it includes information on options like prenatal vitamins, and pharmaceuticals labeled as Category D or X by the Food and Drug
Administration. Reproductive health information, in contrast, refers more to
issues of fertility, birth control, cancer screening via pap smears, and sexually
transmitted infections.
13. Still, there is ample evidence that parents have acted on rudimentary
forms of such information throughout history. Selective infanticide, for example, was “ubiquitous in most preliterate cultures, ranging from about a third
or more of all children born . . . . [C]ensus figures from antiquity show boy/girl
ratios as high as 400 boys to 100 girls—a believable figure since, as
Poseidippos said, ‘even a rich man always exposes a daughter.’” Lloyd
DeMause, A History of Child Abuse, 25 J. PSYCHOHISTORY 216, 226 (1998). In
the decade before Roe v. Wade, the United States experienced two massive
spikes in birth defects during the 1960s. EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS,
AND THE COURTS 21 (1982); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 259 (1991). National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development efforts since the 1960s have successfully
prevented the debilitating effects of the birth defect phenylketonuria (PKU),
just as the rate of neural tube defects dropped once women began using prenatal vitamins following discoveries that linked defects to folate deficiency. Brief
History of Newborn Screening, NIH EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NAT’L INST. OF
CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEV. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/
health/topics/newborn/conditioninfo/Pages/history.aspx.
14. See, for example, sources cited infra note 37 (noting over fifty years of
data showing that most women who are informed of a fetal abnormality will
choose to abort).
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natal, and neonatal sequencing offer promising ways to prevent
the existence of, diagnose, treat, and cure hundreds of serious
birth defects early on, conditions that may otherwise go unnoticed until a point when they are no longer correctable. This information is important because it can expand reproductive autonomy, it can offer information to people considering sexual
activity and reproduction that may be germane to moral choices, and it can make a palpable difference in the lives of future
children.
With such reproductive choice-generating technologies
available in the U.S., parents can now access much of their
child’s health information from sources including routine maternal serum tests during pregnancy visits, specific tests parents may request be done on the fetus prior to birth or the infant after birth, and state-run newborn screening programs.
This increased access to information offers parents reproductive choices, helps prevent the existence of birth defects, and
can mitigate their effects if they do occur. Crucially, however,
this paradigm shift also raises concerns because neither the
federal government nor the majority of states recognize that
the child whose health information is obtained has any rights
to keep that information private, and these concerns will be
magnified in a genomic age. In nearly all states, unemancipated minors have no presumptive rights to refuse if parents
want to have their child’s genome sequenced. If parents do elect
for sequencing, prevailing medical recommendations permit
parents to choose that the results not be returned to the child,
with the exception of results revealing a life-threatening condi15
tion.
This framework is problematic because sequencing a child
16
often reveals that child’s reproductive choice information. No
laws protect this aspect of the genome even though the same
information receives heightened privacy protections in non17
genomic contexts. Reproductive choice information, though, is
15. See Laurence B. McCullough et al., Professionally Responsible Disclosure of Genomic Sequencing Results in Pediatric Practice, 136 PEDIATRICS
e974 (2015); Laine Friedman Ross et al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy
Issues in Genetic Testing and Screening of Children, 15 GENETICS MED. 234
(2013).
16. McCullough et al., supra note 15; Ross et al., supra note 15.
17. Ellen Wright Clayton, How Much Control Do Children and Adolescents Have over Genomic Testing, Parental Access to Their Results, and Parental Communication of Those Results to Others?, 43 J.L. MED. ETHICS 538, 539
(2015).
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an aspect of the genome especially germane to a child’s sexual
and reproductive choices. As such, privacy protections under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), Title X of the Public Health and Safety Act, and state
laws should be construed to protect that aspect of the genome
as an adolescent’s private information. Further, public health
interests are served by encouraging people to be informed by
their reproductive choice information before they become sexually active. Public funding, such as Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, should promote general knowledge about
genomics and reproductive choice information through staterun sex education curricula that introduce key concepts like
18
genetics, inheritance, and reproductive risks.
This Note stresses the importance of having access to one’s
reproductive choice information—a particular problem for adolescents in a genomic age. Part I presents an overview of the
recent emergence of genomics in the clinical setting, with focus
given to problems it creates for adolescent reproductive
healthcare. Part II analyzes prevailing medical recommendations regarding the return of reproductive choice information
and uses judicial precedent to show how clinicians can face
substantial liability if they fail to return reproductive risks. In
many cases, courts have found this failure to violate the abortion right. Part III provides a legal and policy framework that
supports private return of reproductive risks to adolescents individually in the clinical setting, as well as sharing general
knowledge of reproductive choice information and genomics via
19
sex education programs. In arguing for the importance of
knowing reproductive choice information, this Note aims to
promote conditions that equip individuals to contribute to decreasing the prevalence of birth defects.

18. E.g., Sherree Kassuba, Environmental Causes of Birth Defects, YALENEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST., http://teachersinstitute.yale.edu/curriculum/
units/1982/7/82.07.07.x.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (detailing a unit on
birth defects designed for ninth grade students).
19. Cf. Jayne Lucke, Better Sex Education for Young People Is a Public
Health Solution to the Problem of Advanced Maternal Age, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58 (2015) (recommending to promote reproductive choice by discussing the
risks of infertility associated with advanced maternal age in sex education
programs).
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I. GENOMICS AND ADOLESCENT REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS
Genomic sequencing will be the backbone of healthcare’s
20
turn to precision medicine. Indeed, the “dramatic drop” in the
cost of sequencing over the past few years was a catalyst for the
Precision Medicine Initiative, announced in President Obama’s
21
2015 State of the Union Address. Though there is debate as to
whether personalized medicine will increase or decrease
healthcare costs, if the latter is to be possible, a public health
perspective is imperative to create the data to support genomic
22
healthcare. With NIH-funded initiatives underway that are
exploring the benefits of routine newborn genomic screening,
genomics is being “rapidly introduced into pediatric clinical
23
practice.” Additionally, the availability of several direct-toconsumer (DTC) genetic tests have expanded testing outside
hospitals and clinics; since 2008, people could submit a hundred dollars and a sample of saliva via mail to learn about their
risks of developing “everything from macular degeneration to
24
restless leg syndrome.”
This Part provides a background that shows how adolescent reproductive rights will be implicated as precision medicine and genomics become part of standard clinical practice.
The first Section explains how parents have rights to determine
their child’s healthcare decisions and access the child’s health
information. These presumptive rights begin before their future
20. Rita Rubin, Precision Medicine: The Future or Simply Politics?, 313 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1089, 1089 (2015).
21. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (stating that the Initiative would “give all of us access to the personalized information we need to
keep ourselves and our families healthier”).
22. Muin Khoury et al., Beyond Base Pairs to Bedside: A Population Perspective on How Genomics Can Improve Health, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 34,
36 (2012) (“[O]nly a population perspective can fulfill the promise of genomic
medicine.”); see also Muin Khoury, The Public Health Approach to Genetic
Testing in the 21st Century: Saving Lives and Saving Unnecessary Healthcare
Costs, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION GENOMICS & HEALTHCARE IMPACT (Mar. 15, 2012), http://blogs.cdc.gov/genomics/2012/03/15/the-public
-health-approach-to-genetic-testing (“[A] public health approach to genomic
medicine is essential if the new technology is to be used in a way that saves
lives and saves healthcare costs at the same time.”).
23. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e974.
24. Ricki Lewis, A Brief History of Genetic Testing: What the First Generation of Tests Can Tell Us About the Latest, SCI. PROGRESS (May 5, 2008),
http://scienceprogress.org/2008/05/a-brief-history-of-genetic-testing.

2016] REPRODUCTIVE RISKS IN A GENOMIC AGE

833

child is born and continue until the child reaches adulthood.
The second Section introduces the recommendations of prominent medical organizations regarding returning genomic results to minors. These organizations recommend returning a
child’s results to parents rather than directly to the child.
A. PARENTAL VIS-À-VIS MINOR RIGHTS TO REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTHCARE
As sequencing capabilities have been improved and re25
fined, and as they have dramatically dropped in price, more
individuals have been able to access their genomic results in
clinical settings and at home, through DTC testing companies
like 23andMe, Full Genomes, Gene by Gene, Sure Genomics,
26
and YSEQ. In the clinical context, prenatal and neonatal sequencing raise especial concerns about what rights, if any, adolescents have with respect to genomic testing and return of
testing results. DTC options lacking established clinical validity exacerbate these issues, for parents (or a minor with access
to a credit card) can access these options outside the physician27
adolescent relationship.
This Section shows how parents presumptively have full
control over their children’s health information. The first Subsection explains how federal abortion jurisprudence protects a
woman’s right to have unrestricted access to her child’s genomic information throughout her pregnancy. The next shows
how both parents additionally have virtually unlimited access
to their child’s genomic information in infancy and childhood.
The third Subsection describes how the presumption of parental control begins to shift in adolescence, with federal and state
laws granting minors rights to access reproductive services privately from parents, to obtain their own health information,

25. Rubin, supra note 20.
26. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); FULL
GENOMES DNA SEQUENCING, https://www.fullgenomes.com (last visited Nov.
1, 2016); GENE BY GENE, https://www.genebygene.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2016); SURE GENOMICS, http://suregenomics.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2016);
YSEQ DNA ORIGINS PROJECT, http://yseq.net (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
27. 23andMe’s privacy statement, for example, implies the benefits of direct-to-consumer genomic testing can extend to children as early as age thirteen. Full Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/
-privacy (last updated Sept. 29, 2016) (“Neither 23andMe nor any of its Services are designed for, intended to attract, or directed toward children under
the age of 13.”).
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and to refuse genetic and genomic testing if they do not want it
done.
1. Parental Rights To Obtain a Child’s Genomic Results in
Utero
To understand the lack of control minors have over their
genomic information, it is crucial to consider federal and state
abortion law as a backdrop. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
28
recognized abortion as a woman’s constitutional right. Revisiting that holding two decades later in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, Justice O’Connor provided the undue burden test as an
alternative to Roe’s strict scrutiny analysis, recognizing that
“there is a substantial state interest in potential life” not only
post-viability (as was the case under Roe) but throughout a
29
pregnancy. The Court held in Casey that abortion restrictions
that are “unduly burdensome” will be struck down as unconsti30
tutional. Under Casey’s analysis, “[a] burden may be ‘undue’
either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate,
31
rational justification.”
Thus, under federal abortion jurisprudence—which the
Supreme Court updated for the first time since 2007 in Whole
32
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt —it is unclear whether a state
could ever deny a woman from using an available prenatal test.
Sequenom’s MaterniT 21, for instance, is a non-invasive fetal
sequencing option commercially available since 2011 that de33
tects Down syndrome, among other trisomies and mutations.
This reproductive choice information enables women to choose
whether or not to continue their pregnancies after diagnosis.
Congress and roughly half of state legislatures have considered
bills in the past few years seeking to prohibit abortions to select
against the fetus’s sex, race, or health, thus not prohibiting fe34
tal testing per se but rather the abortions that may ensue.
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
30. Id. at 874.
31. Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
32. The Court upheld Casey’s undue burden standard, holding that a Texas law requiring doctors who preform abortions to have admitting privileges at
a local hospital did not serve a legitimate state interest. Whole Women’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311–13 (2016).
33. MaterniT21 Plus, SEQUENOM, https://laboratories.sequenom.com/
test/reproductive-health/maternit21-plus (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
34. E.g., Assemb. B. 2336, 2013–2104 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B.
2790, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); H.B. 1585, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d
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Though it may seem that such laws would overstep Casey’s
“undue burden” standard, North Dakota has had such a ban in
35
force since 2013, and Indiana has had one on the books since
36
March 2016.
One justification states could assert for denying access to
genetic testing is that this promotes the state’s interest in fetal
life, since studies have shown for decades that women will be
more likely to obtain an abortion if they learn of a fetal abnor37
mality than if they never had such information. States could
also argue such testing makes selective, expressively discriminatory abortions possible because of the fetus’s sex or genetic
status; such laws might have a rational, legitimate connection
38
to a state interest in protecting the civil rights of the unborn.

Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); H.B. 4034, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014);
H.B. 7383, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2376, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(R.I. 2014); H.B. 98, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); H.B. 2371, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); H.B. 1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2013); S.B. 56, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 845, 115th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); H.B.
1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S.B. 183, 118th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S. File 13, 85th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013);
H.B. 1567, 188th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); Assemb. B. 2533, 236th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); H.B. 309,
83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis.
2014); S.B. 201, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014); H.B. 5731, 96th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2012); Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012);
H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012); H.B. 1155, 2009–2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); S.B. 529, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010);
H.B. 693, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); H. File 1196, 86th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2009); S. File 1073, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013).
36. Tribune News Serv., Indiana Governor Oks Fetal Defects Abortion
Ban, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/midwest/ct-indiana-abortion-ban-genetic-abnormalities-20160324
-story.html.
37. See Tamsen Caruso et al., Impact of Prenatal Screening on the Birth
Status of Fetuses with Down Syndrome at an Urban Hospital, 1972-1994, 1
GENET. MED. 22 (1998); Mathias Forrester & Ruth Merz, Epidemiology of
Down Syndrome, 65 TERATOLOGY 207 (2002); Ralph Kramer et al., Determinants of Parental Decisions After the Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome,
79 AM. J. MED. GENET. 172 (1998); Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination
Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis for Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review,
19 PRENAT. DIAGN. 808 (1999); Jaime Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of
Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review of Termination Rates (1995-2011), 32
PRENAT. DIAGN. 142 (2012).
38. See Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglas Prenatal Discrimination
Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3541 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent
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One might argue denying in utero testing cannot be unduly
burdensome because it does not affect the legality of or access
to abortion. This is unlikely given the Supreme Court’s articulation of abortion as falling within a woman’s liberty rights. As
the Court remarked in Casey, decisions whether or not to terminate a pregnancy are “choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty protected by the
39
Fourteenth Amendment,” which includes a woman’s autono40
my to “determine her life’s course” and exercise “control over
41
her destiny” by opting to terminate the pregnancy. Thus, even
if a state can posit a legitimate interest in discouraging postdiagnosis abortions, a prohibition on in utero testing could be
found unconstitutionally burdensome for violating the woman’s
decisional autonomy regarding her abortion choice. Indeed,
Planned Parenthood recently filed suit to enjoin Indiana’s ab42
normality-selective abortion ban from going into effect. One
upshot of these considerations concerning the nature of in utero
testing as a liberty found within the abortion right, in sum, is
that parents can have unrestricted access to their child’s ge43
nomic information prior to birth.
2. Parental Rights To Obtain a Child’s Genomic Results in
Infancy and Childhood
From the in utero context to state-run newborn screening
to testing in infancy and early childhood, the child whose
health information is obtained has virtually no rights for that
44
information to be kept private from parents. In addition to the
possibility of prenatal testing, genetic results are routinely obtained shortly after birth, as is the case in the newborn screening programs mandated by law in all fifty states and the Dis45
trict of Columbia, except Wyoming. These programs identify
Franks) (describing the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act).
39. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
40. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
42. Emma Green, Indiana Tried To Raise Ethical Challenges to Abortion,
but Will Probably Fail, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2016), http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2016/07/indiana-tried-to-raise-ethical-challenges-to
-abortion-but-will-probably-fail/489746.
43. Clayton, supra note 17, at 540.
44. See id.
45. Michelle Huckaby Lewis & Aaron Goldberg, Return of Results from
Researching Using Newborn Screening Dried Blood Samples, 43 J.L. MED.
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roughly 12,500 children annually with metabolic, endocrine,
46
hematologic, or functional disorders. If clinically significant
results arise, state laboratories notify clinicians, who relay the
information to parents to enable them to seek diagnostic con47
firmation. Prevailing medical guidelines are to return to parents diagnoses and risk assessments for conditions that are life
48
threatening or can be ameliorated only in childhood. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development is
now exploring the possibility of newborn genomic screening
49
programs. Several state statutes explicitly grant parents con50
trol over their child’s newborn screening results. If a child exhibits symptoms of an undiagnosed condition in infancy and
early childhood, parents might have further reason to gain access to the child’s genomic information. Beyond early childhood,
51
genomic testing of children is uncommon.
3. Genetic Testing and Reproductive Rights in Adolescence
Legal and ethical issues concerning pediatric sequencing
become more complex in later childhood, adolescence, and nearadulthood, as unemancipated minors become more capable of
comprehending and making decisions in light of their personal
health information. In these contexts, questions arise concerning the extent to which the broadly protected rights of parents
to choose how to raise their children—among the earliest of
52
substantive due process rights —allow them to control the minor’s healthcare. It is possible that this permission for parents
to control their children’s healthcare can run into tension with
ETHICS 559, 560 (2015).
46. Id.
47. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e979.
48. Id. at e978.
49. NIH Program Explores the Use of Genomic Sequencing in Newborn
Healthcare, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nih.gov/news
-events/news-releases/nih-program-explores-use-genomic-sequencing-newborn
-healthcare.
50. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124980 (2015); N.H. STAT.
§ 132:10a (2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33.0111 (2015).
51. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 234.
52. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding a law
requiring children’s attendance at public schools unconstitutional because it
interfered with parental rights to “direct the upbringing” of their children);
Meier v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (finding a law restricting foreignlanguage education to violate parents’ rights to choose their children’s education, a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

838

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:827

the heightened legal protections accorded to adolescent reproductive services and information in other (non-genomic) contexts. This Section describes federal and state laws giving adolescents private access to reproductive services, protections for
keeping adolescent reproductive information secure, and professional guidelines concerning adolescent rights to refuse genetic and genomic testing.
a. Protections for Adolescent Access to Reproductive Services
A first set of exceptions to the presumption of parental control over the healthcare of their children concerns the minor’s
right to access services related to their reproductive choices
privately from parents. Supreme Court precedent regarding
adolescent reproductive rights came in the wake of decisions
finding a privacy right to access contraception within the Con53
stitution’s “penumbras” and “emanations,” as well as in the
wake of Roe’s recognition of the abortion right. In Carey v. Population Services International, the Supreme Court recognized
that minors possess constitutional rights to obtain non54
prescription contraceptives without parental consent. In
Bellotti v. Baird, the Court also extended to minors a right to
obtain abortion services without parental consent, though
55
states can require judicial approval in lieu of it. The Court refrained from extending Roe’s full protection to minors, stressing
their “inability to make critical decisions in an informed and
mature manner and the importance of the parental role in child
56
rearing.”
Federal and state statutory law also promotes the abilities
of adolescents to access services related to their reproductive
choices privately from parents. The family planning program
established in 1970 under Title X of the Public Health and
Safety Act provides federal funds for family planning clinics to
provide low-income patients with services “including natural
family planning methods, infertility services, and services for
adolescents”; in the case of adolescents, providers must encour-

53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
54. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977).
55. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
56. Id. at 634.
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age but cannot require family involvement. Additionally, all
states have statutes permitting minors access to certain clinical
services without parental permission, such as services related
58
to sexual activity, drug and alcohol abuse, and mental health.
The majority of states have explicit statutory authorizations for
pregnant minors to obtain prenatal and delivery services without parental notification or consent, and state “lawmakers have
generally resisted attempts to impose a parental consent or notification requirement on minors’ access to reproductive health
59
care and other sensitive services.”
b. Protections for Adolescent Access to Reproductive
Information
In addition to these protections for adolescents to access
healthcare services and products like contraception, abortion
and counseling, federal and state laws also provide an exception to the presumption of parental control over an adolescent’s
right to access health information. Under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), “protected health
information” is defined as “individually identifiable” health in60
formation, where “health information” is any oral or recorded
61
information “created or received by a health care provider”
and “relates to . . . the provision of health care to an individu62
al.”
Parental rights under HIPAA are covered in the section on
63
personal representatives. That section states that “if under
[the] applicable law [a person] has authority to act on behalf of
. . . an unemancipated minor in making decisions related to
health care, a covered entity must treat such person as a per64
sonal representative.” At the same time, HIPAA states that,
with regard to protected health information pertaining to a
57. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2012).
58. See ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., STATE MINOR CONSENT LAWS: A SUMMARY (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the laws in each of the fifty U.S. states and
the District of Columbia that allow minors to give their own consent for health
care).
59. Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right To Consent
to Healthcare, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL’Y 4, 4 (2000).
60. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 § 1171(4)(A) (1996).
62. Id. § 1171(4)(B).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2013).
64. Id. § 164.502(g)(2) (emphasis added).
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healthcare service, parents “may” not be representatives when
“minor[s] may obtain such services lawfully without parental
65
consent.” In other words, HIPAA requires that parents be
treated as representatives who act on behalf of their child in
making healthcare decisions, unless there is judicial precedent—such as Carey and Bellotti, or other applicable federal or
state laws giving the minor rights to access healthcare without
parental involvement.
c. Adolescent Rights To Refuse Testing
Lastly, concerning not the right to access but the minor’s
right to refuse genetic and genomic testing, “unemancipated
minors have virtually no access to the courts to enjoin parental
66
behavior.” In part, this is because of the wide latitude granted
67
to parents in choosing how to raise their children. It is also
because child protection agencies would be unlikely to intervene to uphold a minor’s refusal to be tested because, absent a
risk of serious harm to the child, non-invasive testing cannot
68
qualify as neglect or abuse. Still, physicians have discretion to
refuse parental wishes if they deem them to be “inappropriate”
69
for the child, which could plausibly include obtaining samples
for sequencing from a teenager who expressly does not want it
done. Indeed, professional ethical standards are that clinicians
should not perform testing on minors who object if they are
70
“older school-age children.” Though the physician’s assessment of appropriateness could initially parry parental rights,
the riposte is that parents are free to find another clinician
willing to perform such tests in these situations, and, as discussed, they are free to have the child’s genome sequenced in
utero.

65. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B).
66. Clayton, supra note 17, at 540.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Arthur Kohrman et al., Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 317 (1995) (issuing a statement by the American Academy of Pediatricians that older-age children “frequently have decision-making capacity and the legal authority to accept or reject interventions, and, in that event, no additional requirement to obtain
parental permission exists. However, the Academy encourages parental involvement in such cases, as appropriate”).
70. Id. at 316; see also Am. Acad. Pediatrics, AAP Publications Reaffirmed
and Retired, 130 PEDIATRICS e467 (2012) (reaffirming ethical standards on assent for older minors).
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In sum, this Part has thus far shown how minors have legal protection for some aspects of their sexual and reproductive
information. Protections exist for information generated
through services they access in the clinical setting, and even
71
records from school health services. However, there are no
protections for reproductive information generated by services
accessed by their parents. Yet this is precisely the problem created by pediatric genomics: it is not a health service that adolescents can access on their own but rather an option their parents may elect for, generating large amounts of the child’s
health information when the child is too young to consent or is
not yet born. As such, current laws are inadequate to protect an
adolescent’s reproductive choice information in a genomic age.
B. MEDICAL VIEWS ON RETURN OF GENOMIC REPRODUCTIVE
INFORMATION TO MINORS
Federal laws such as HIPAA and Title X of the PHSA,
state laws, and contraception and abortion jurisprudence are
not the only sources of guidelines for returning results of reproductive significance to minors. Rather, there is an extensive
literature on best practices for returning results of “reproduc72
73
74
tive significance,” in both clinical and research settings.
71. A student’s school health records at the elementary and secondary
levels are considered “education records” under FERPA, thereby releasable to
parents. They can be kept private from parents only if the student is over
eighteen or attends a postsecondary institution. See Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JOINT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) AND THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) TO STUDENT HEALTH RECORDS 1 (2008).
72. E.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS ISSUES,
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND
SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TOCONSUMER CONTEXTS 79–89 (2013) (discussing clinical and research duties
regarding results of “reproductive significance”). See generally Diane
Korngiebel et al., Generating a Taxonomy for Genetic Conditions Relevant to
Reproductive Planning, 170A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 565 (2016) (researching
best practices and ethical concerns in sharing reproductive planning results);
Michael Leo et al., Patients’ Ratings of Genetic Conditions Validate a Taxonomy To Simplify Decisions About Preconception Carrier Screening via Genome
Sequencing, 170A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 574 (2016) (exploring which types of
genetic testing information parents want to know in their reproductive planning).
73. See Lisa Parker, The Future of Incidental Findings: Should They Be
Viewed as Benefits?, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 341, 342 (2008); Benjamin Wilfond &
Katrina Goddard, It’s Complicated: Criteria for Policy Decisions for the Clini-
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Additionally, though the plaintiffs have typically been adults,
neonatal torts can be another source of guidelines for protecting
the right to know reproductive choice information in adolescence.
This Section develops an exception to the presumption of
parental control over an adolescent’s reproductive choice information. The first Subsection introduces recent guidelines by influential professional organizations detailing a clinician’s duty
of care when genomic sequencing reveals an adolescent’s “reproductive risks.” The second Subsection discusses the variety
of prenatal torts that can be brought against clinicians and
others for failing to warn individuals about their reproductive
risks.
1. Medical Views on Genomics in Adolescence: An Exception
for Reproductive Risks
Prominent medical organizations are supportive of pediatric sequencing in a number of circumstances. The American
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) and American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued a joint policy statement in 2013 in which they supported the initiation of pediatric
genomic testing if parents know of a family history of a mutation, but the organizations otherwise do not favor pre75
symptomatic sequencing. In a separate policy statement it issued the same year, the ACMG recommended that when parcal Integration of Genome-Scale Sequencing for Reproductive Decision Making,
3 MOLECULAR GENETIC & GENOMIC MED. 239, 239–40 (2015).
74. Robert Klitzman et al., Researcher’s Views on Returning Incidental
Genomic Research Results: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 15 GENETICS MED. 888, 888 (2013); Susan Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings
and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived
Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 373 (2012) (“[We] suggest[ ] that findings of
reproductive importance should fall in the ‘may return’ category.”); see also
Denise Avard et al., Pediatric Research and the Return of Individual Research
Results, 39 J.L. MED. ETHICS 593, 599 (2011) (“In some circumstances, research results will reveal the carrier status of the child. Carrier status should
generally not be communicated to parents because it has no implications for
the immediate future health of the child, but rather should be provided when
the adolescent begins to consider his or her reproductive health.”); Susan Wolf
et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis
and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 219, 229 (2008) (“Including
among researcher duties an obligation to offer to disclose to participants [information of ] . . . reproductive importance is consistent not only with legal
recognition of researchers’ special obligations toward participants, but also
with legal doctrine imposing a duty to warn of foreseeable harm.”).
75. Ross et al., supra note 15.
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ents obtain pediatric whole genome or exome sequencing in
search of a primary indication, incidental findings should be returned to parents if they reveal conditions that are early onset,
life threatening, or necessitate ameliorative measures in child76
hood. The ACMG initially stated in this recommendation that
parents should not be permitted to opt out of the analysis of in77
78
cidental findings. However, after criticism on this point, the
organization released a policy update in 2014 permitting par79
ents to opt out of the analysis.
In addition to returning results to parents, the ACMG and
AAP support returning incidental findings of reproductive risks
to minors, as does the NIH’s Clinical Sequencing Exploratory
80
Research Pediatric Working Group (CSER-PWG). The ACMG
and AAP do not support screening in the school context, but
they suggest clinical carrier screening may be appropriate for
81
adolescents who are “pregnant or considering reproduction.”
They claim the benefits of clinical carrier screening can “include potentially greater acceptance and integration of status
into life plans, avoidance of the shock and resentment that may
accrue when disclosure is delayed, and greater opportunity for
parental guidance,” and “reproductive benefits include avoiding
the birth of a child with genetic disease or having time to pre82
pare for the birth of a child with genetic disease.”
Meanwhile, CSER-PWG maintains that pediatricians have
a “prima facie, autonomy-based ethical obligation to provide
adolescent patients, ideally before they become sexually active,
83
with reproductive risk assessment results.” However, minors
76. Robert Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS
MED. 565, 568 (2013).
77. Id.
78. Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We Need To Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854, 857 (2013).
79. Am. Coll. Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Updates Recommendation on “Opt Out” for Genomic Sequencing Return of Results, ACMG NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_
ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf.
80. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e979.
81. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 237; see also Jennifer Schneider et al., “Is
It Worth Knowing?”: Focus Group Participants’ Perceived Utility of Genomic
Preconception Carrier Screening, 25 J. GENETIC COUNS. 135, 135 (2016) (noting a mixture of “certain” and “hesitant” participants with respect to interest
in obtaining genomic carrier screening results).
82. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 237.
83. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e978.
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should be permitted “to refuse to learn or to act on the results
84
of reproductive risk assessment.” In agreement with the
ACMG’s 2014 update permitting parents to opt out, CSERPWG contends that parents do not violate a prima facie ethical
obligation to their child by choosing not to tell the child of non85
life-threatening incidental findings. The recommendations of
these organizations, in other words, is that it would be beneficial to analyze and return reproductive risks to minors, but this
is ultimately the parent’s decision.
2. Neonatal Torts and the Clinician’s Reasons To Mitigate
Liability Risks: A Problem with Medical Recommendations
The ACMG and CSER-PWG recommendations are valuable, particularly because they emphasize that there are good
reasons to encourage knowledge of reproductive risks before an
individual becomes sexually active. This Subsection argues that
these recommendations do not, however, account sufficiently
for the risks clinicians face from neonatal litigation—a problem
created because they do not recommend returning genomic re86
productive choice information directly to minors.
The ACMG and CSER-PWG recommendation that parents
should have control over their child’s reproductive choice information is problematic because parents are not subject to lia87
bility for failing to disclose these risks to their children. By
contrast, clinicians, other medical personnel (such as ultrasonographers), and non-medical personnel (such as pharmaceutical
companies) in most states can face substantial liability from
wrongful life, wrongful birth, wrongful conception, or even
wrongful death causes of action that could be brought for fail88
ing to warn minors of their reproductive risks. Namely, clinicians can be liable if a court finds such a failure to be the proximate cause of a patient having a child with birth defects, when
the patient otherwise would have avoided conception or would
89
have aborted.
In Molloy v. Meier, for example, a couple filed a claim
against three doctors asserting they were negligent for failing
84. Id. at e979.
85. Id.
86. See notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
87. See Carel Stolker, Wrongful Life: The Limits of Liability and Beyond,
43 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 521, 534 (1994).
88. Id. at 521.
89. Id. at 527.
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to diagnose Fragile X syndrome in the couple’s first child. The
parents sought damages for the birth of a second child with the
condition, asserting they would have obtained a tubal ligation if
they had known; that fact characterized it as a “wrongful con91
ception” cause of action. The Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the doctors had breached duties of care both to the second
92
child with Fragile X and also her parents. The court found
that, in the course of treating their first child, the doctor should
have alerted the parents of the “high probability” their future
93
children would be born with the syndrome. Since the parents
would have obtained a tubal ligation, the court found that the
94
cause of action and damages accrued at conception.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Molloy recognized that
doctors had breached a duty to the second child; this is curious
because Minnesota has a statutory prohibition on “wrongful
95
life” lawsuits. In that type of action, the suit is brought by or
on behalf of the child, seeking damages as compensation for being born with a condition such as Fragile X as the result of another party’s negligence. Molloy is puzzling because the court
found the doctor had breached a duty to a party that was prohibited from seeking legal compensation for that breach. In the
1960s, plaintiffs seeking compensation for being born “adulterine bastard[s]” brought the first wrongful life cases that arose
96
against parents. Post-Roe, many of these suits had the new
component that the parents would have exercised the abortion
right, rather than never conceived, if doctors had warned them
of a reproductive risk. On several occasions, for instance, cases
were brought on behalf of an infant with congenital rubella
syndrome by parents asserting they were unaware that the
mother’s contraction of the German measles created this reproductive risk. In one such case, the infant plaintiff’s mother
stated in her deposition that “I would have done the kindest

90. 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004).
91. Id. at 716.
92. Id. at 719.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 722.
95. MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2002).
96. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); see also
Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966) (dismissing a claim that the
State was negligent in allowing a hospitalized mother to give birth out of wedlock).
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thing that I could have known to have done for her, and that
97
would have been to terminate the pregnancy.”
State legislatures and courts have reacted negatively to the
wrongful life cause of action, with all but six prohibiting it by
98
statute or judicial decision. By contrast, though, roughly half
of states recognize “wrongful birth” claims, which enable parents to recover for their harm in not having the opportunity to
make an informed abortion decision because of a doctor’s fail99
ure to return reproductive risks. There have been numerous
wrongful birth suits, some in which parents have recovered
eight-figure settlements against medical personnel and institu100
tions. In comparison, there have been fewer than 200 wrong101
ful life cases. Still, plaintiffs have successfully recovered in at
least a dozen of those, with the most commonly litigated and
recovered condition being Down syndrome (also the most com102
mon birth defect ), for which the average settlement award is
103
Others include a New York case in which
$734,639.
$3,837,477 was recovered on behalf of an infant who was confined for the rest of his life to a hospital with multiple severe
104
defects. In that case, the plaintiff’s mother underwent three
97. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975).
98. Deborah Pergament & Katie Ilijic, The Legal Past, Present and Future
of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Professional Liability and Other Legal Challenges
Affecting Patient Access to Service, 3 J. CLINICAL MED. 1437, 1445 (2014).
99. For a systematic overview of statutory responses to wrongful life suits,
see William Duncan, Statutory Responses to “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful
Life” Actions, U. FAC. FOR LIFE, http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/Duncan-04.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2016).
100. See, e.g., Carol M. Ostrom, $50M Awarded over Birth Defect; Test Said
Baby Would Be Okay, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.seattletimes
.com/seattle-news/50-m-awarded-over-birth-defect-test-said-baby-would-be
-okay.
101. This figure comes from the author’s own research. After reviewing
roughly 1200 cases from 1963 up until 2016, there have been roughly 150 cases since the first case, depending on how one defines the “wrongful life” cause
of action
102. Birth Defects: Data and Statistics, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/data.html (last updated
June 22, 2015).
103. J.C. v. Health Partners Med. Grp., No. BC394518, 2009 Jury Verdicts
LEXIS 446678 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2009); Olivares ex rel. G.O. v. L.A. Med. Ctr.,
No. BC352486, 2008 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 57175 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008); Unnamed Father ex rel. Unnamed Minor v. Unnamed Hosp., 2008 WL 747741
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2008); Confidential (S99-07-16), 1998 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
72413 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1998).
104. Branca v. Miro, No. 0735/01, 2004 NY Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS
823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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105

ultrasounds, all of which she was told were normal. Discovery
revealed that the ultrasonographer has signaled a “red flag” to
the defendant doctor, which he neglected to convey to the plain106
tiff’s mother. The negligence claim also asserted the defendant gave her advice not to have an alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) test
done, and she opted not to have the test done in reliance on
107
that advice. A case of congenital chicken pox, also involving
108
multiple severe defects, settled for $3,325,000. There have
been seven-figure settlements for a failure to warn about reproductive risks for other congenital conditions as well, such as
109
cystic fibrosis.
In sum, this Part first showed how U.S. laws create a presumption of parental control over their child’s healthcare, but
an exception is carved out in adolescence for information and
services germane to the adolescent’s reproductive choices. It
then discussed pertinent medical recommendations on genomics in adolescence, bringing two lines of criticism against
them. First, these recommendations provide inadequate protection for the reproductive rights of adolescents. Second, they fail
to reflect the clinician’s full duty of care in this context, with
neonatal torts helping to sketch a better picture of that duty.
II. REASONS TO PROMOTE ADOLESCENT PRIVACY AND
KNOWLEDGE OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
INFORMATION
Part I argued that while adolescents have protections for
the privacy of their reproductive choice information and access
to reproductive healthcare services, there are few state and no
federal laws extending these protections to genomic results.
This is a significant gap because, with the exception of target110
enrichment methods of sequencing, whole genome or exome
sequencing is not targeted; information about reproductive
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Toth-Lewis ex rel. B.T.L. v. Walden, No. BC391854, 2010 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 51458 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).
109. Confidential v. Confidential OB/GYN, 2010 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 5322
(2010) (claiming that the failure of a doctor to inform the mother in her first,
miscarried pregnancy that she was a carrier for cystic fibrosis resulted in her
husband not being tested and a second child being born with the disorder).
110. See, e.g., Stavros Bashiadres et al., Direct Genomic Selection, 2 NATURE METHODS 63 (2005) (studying genetic variants by targeting specific genomic regions).
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risks and other gene variants will inevitably be revealed by sequencing if those variants exist. A healthcare regime in which
sequencing is routine must grapple with what to do with such
secondary, incidental findings, especially when they reveal reproductive choice information. This Part analyzes the reasons
to withhold and reasons to return results to adolescents and
concludes that in the case of genomic results of reproductive
significance, there are greater reasons to return than to withhold.
A. POTENTIAL REASONS TO WITHHOLD CATEGORICAL RESULTS
FROM ADOLESCENTS
Despite the benefits of informing adolescent reproductive
choices with genomic information, one reason not to return results is that knowledge of one’s genetic or genomic information
could induce unwanted anxiety. Brian Hurley, for example,
learned from his ophthalmologist at age thirteen that at some
111
point in his life, he would go blind from retinitis pigmentosa.
“It was like having a time bomb inside of me,” he remarked
112
about the prognosis. His vision did steadily deteriorate after
college, and he had lost the majority of his eyesight by the time
113
he was thirty-three. “The irony,” he concluded, “is the anticipation was much worse than the actual loss. It was a relief to
114
stop worrying about when the loss would occur.” Though this
may reflect the experiences of some, systematic reviews have
found “insufficient evidence to inform a nuanced understanding
115
of how children respond to genetic testing.”
Public health concerns may also counsel against return of
results to the extent that knowledge of one’s genomic information reinforces unhealthy life choices that produce a public
burden. For example, public health genomic policies could attempt to identify genotypes that modulate smoking status, ini111. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS ISSUES, PRIVACY
AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOMIC SEQUENCING 23 (2012).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Andrea Patenaude, Save the Children: Direct-to-Consumer Testing of
Children Is Premature, Even for Research, 36 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 1122,
1124 (2011); see also Katherine James et al., Impact of Direct-to-Consumer
Predictive Genomic Testing on Risk Perception and Worry Among Patients Receiving Routine Care in a Preventive Health Clinic, 86 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 933
(2011) (suggesting that patients receiving predicting genomic risk information
does not necessarily influence risk assessment or level of worry).
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116

tiation, cessation, and treatments. While using such an initiative to identify individuals who have a high susceptibility to
cancer may motivate them to quit, it may also “enable[] those
who are unsuccessful in quitting to blame genetic factors,
117
which would thereby decrease motivation.” Facilitating such
genetic fatalism affects the public interest not only because of
smoking-related disabilities, but also because the testing itself
would be an inefficient use of resources if it did not result in
changing individual behavior. Further, inasmuch as knowledge
of one’s genetic information can cause anxiety about one’s
118
health, the predictive, prognostic role of genomics (its role in
providing risk assessments rather than diagnoses) could con119
tribute to unnecessary surveillance and further testing.
An appropriate policy for return of results to minors should
be cognizant of such potential negative psychological responses
to knowing one’s genomic information, as well as the limited
abilities of adolescents to make well-informed, autonomous decisions. Along this line, legal philosopher Joel Feinberg has posited an influential argument that children possess a set of moral rights to an “open future,” that is, rights not to have
120
important life choices determined by others. Numerous authors have applied Feinberg’s argument in the context of genetic testing, claiming it is generally better to delay until adulthood the decision of whether or not to view one’s genetic
121
results. Feinberg’s claim is that it is the autonomy of adults
116. See, e.g., Evy Cleeran et al., Public Health in the Genomic Era: Will
Public Health Genomics Contribute to Major Changes in the Prevention of Disease?, 69 ARCHIVES PUB. HEALTH 1, 6–7 (2011).
117. Clarissa Allen, Karine Sénécal, & Denise Avard, Defining the Scope of
Public Engagement: Examining the “Right Not To Know” in Public Health Genomics, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 11, 16 (2014).
118. Though not focusing on adolescent populations, recent surveys have
found mixed results, with some people experiencing anxiety from knowing genomic results, others equanimity, and others enthusiasm. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Duffour et al., Reproductive Decision-Making in MMR Mutation Carriers After
Results Disclosure: Impact of Psychological Status in Childbearing Options, 25
J. GENETIC COUNS. 433, 439 (2016) (finding that twelve percent of participants
experienced a high level of initial stress from learning results, but that stress
decreased over time); Schneider et al., supra note 81, at 139.
119. See LAURINDA HARMAN & FRANCES CORNELIUS, ETHICAL HEALTH INFORMATICS 257 (3d ed. 2015).
120. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125–26
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
121. See, e.g., Joseph Millum, The Foundation of the Child’s Right to an
Open Future, 45 J. SOC. PHIL. 522, 531–34 (2014).
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to make informed choices that is valuable, and their “rights-in122
trust” should be protected in childhood.
1. Adolescent Sexual Privacy
Feinberg contends genetic information should be withheld
until adulthood because it is in the future adult’s interest not to
know genetic results in childhood but rather only after pos123
sessing sufficiently mature autonomy. In other words, there
is an appropriate time to exercise the right, where appropriateness is determined by relevant decisional capacities. By parity
of reasoning, the appropriate time to know reproductive choice
information should be determined by the relevant decisional
capacities for knowing that information. The point of returning
reproductive risks is to inform reproductive and sexual choices.
Thus one could be said to possess the relevant decisional capacities by virtue of making such choices. There are consequently
reasons to return results of reproductive significance in adolescence because eighteen percent of people have had sex by age
fourteen or younger, thirty percent by sixteen, and most older
124
teens (seventeen to nineteen) are sexually active.
If a child’s reproductive choice information is given to parents, this does not guarantee it gets to the right actor. Parents
might forget to inform their child—for example, if the results
were revealed in infancy). Or they might be motivated by personal moral convictions not to return results, for example, out
of a concern that the information will raise the chances the minor will consider abortion. It seems less likely that parents
would maliciously withhold results and more likely that they
would not know when to divulge them, because they do not
know when their child will begin sexual activity. In short, giving parents the authority to be a conduit, as the ACMG and
CSER-PWG ultimately recommend, may do little to get the information to minors when it is appropriate for them to have it.
It would indeed seem odd to suppose that minors would ask
122. Feinberg, supra note 120.
123. See generally id. (concluding certain rights and responsibilities are
best left to adults).
124. Lawrence B. Finer & Jesse M. Philbin, Sexual Initiation, Contraceptive Use, and Pregnancy Among Young Adults, 131 PEDIATRICS 886, 886
(2013); see also Gladys M. Martinez & Joyce C. Abma, Sexual Activity, Contraceptive Use, and Childbearing of Teenagers Aged 15–19 in the United States,
209 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS. DATA BRIEF 1, 1 (2015) (finding that, of
fifteen to nineteen year-olds, forty-four percent of females and forty-nine percent of males had had sexual intercourse).

2016] REPRODUCTIVE RISKS IN A GENOMIC AGE

851

their parents for this information prior to becoming sexually
active.
2. Increased Birth Defects in Adolescent Pregnancies
Pregnancies in adolescence are attended by certain birth
defect risks less likely to occur later in life. One source of increased birth defect risks is that certain fetal abnormalities will
be more likely to develop in adolescent pregnancies. For instance, most pregnancies in adolescence are unplanned: the
rate of unplanned pregnancies in sexually active teenage girls
125
is twice that rate in all women. When this unplanned nature
is combined with teenage drinking and lower uses of contraception in adolescents than adults, it leads to an increased risk of
126
fetal alcohol syndrome. Further, women planning pregnancies are more likely to be taking prenatal vitamins like folic acid; the greater prevalence of unplanned pregnancies in adolescents consequently poses an increased risk of central nervous
127
system defects.
Another source of increased birth defect risks in adolescent
pregnancies is the lower likelihood that those pregnancies will
end in abortion. In 2014, eighty-five percent of abortions in the
United States were sought by women in their 20s and 30s,
while, according to Guttmacher Institute data, fewer than
128
twelve were sought by women younger than twenty. In preliminary data for 2015, the CDC reports that the U.S. fertility
rate was 22.3 per 1000 women in the fifteen-to-nineteen-year129
old age group, or 249,078 births annually.

125. Lawrence B. Finer, Unintended Pregnancy Among U.S. Adolescents:
Accounting for Sexual Activity, 47 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 312, 313 (2010).
126. Ramona Allard-Hendren, Alcohol Use and Adolescent Pregnancy, 25
AM. J. MATERNAL/CHILD NURSING 159, 159 (2000) (“Reports indicate that
33.4% of adolescents engage in heavy episodic alcohol consumption, and that
34.8% of adolescents are sexually active by the age of 15 without using any
form of contraception.”).
127. Xi-Kuan Chen et al., Teenage Pregnancy and Congenital Anomalies:
Which System Is Vulnerable?, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1730, 1735 (2007) (stating
that folic acid intake decreases neural disorders and teenagers are less likely
to take folic acid).
128. JENNA JERMAN ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS
IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 5 (2016).
129. Bradley E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2015, NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REPORTS, at 2, June 2, 2016.
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3. Adolescent Health Information Rights as a Limitation on
Parental Reproductive Rights
Reproductive choice information may also warrant in utero
protection. This Note has described return of reproductive risks
as an adolescent right because adolescence is when sexual activity is typically initiated. Under Feinberg’s open future analysis, the adult’s autonomy right to make a reasoned, mature
choice whether or not to see genetic results requires protection
130
throughout childhood before it can be exercised. Similarly, if
adolescence is when individuals are beginning to make reproductive decisions, then it may be necessary to securely store re131
productive choice information securely until then. Feinberg’s
argument provides reason for withholding certain genetic information from children throughout childhood to protect their
reproductive autonomy as adults—i.e., so they can make a mature, better-informed decision about whether or not they want
132
For reproductive choice inforto know that information.
mation, though, the child’s reproductive autonomy is protected
by withholding information from parents and encouraging the
child to access it in adolescence prior to becoming sexually active.
This could bring adolescent reproductive rights into tension with the protections surrounding their mothers’ abortion
right—namely, when the adolescent was still a fetus. It seems
possible, though, to respect both sets of reproductive rights. A
pregnant woman, on the one hand, could be permitted to use
fetal genomic sequencing as part of her choice to determine
whether or not to bring a particular pregnancy to term. On the
other, rather than being given all clinically significant results,
she could only be given access to the subset of the fetus’s genome that is contemporaneously relevant to her reproductive
choices.
For instance, fetal genomic sequencing might reveal trisomy-21 (a missing chromosome that signals that the future
130. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 120, at 125 (distinguishing “A-C-rights”
possessed by adults and children, such as a right not to be punched, from “Arights,” such as the right to vote, and “C-rights,” rooted in children’s dependency on others for food, shelter, and protection).
131. Id. at 125–26 (“When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to
children who are clearly not yet capable of exercising them, their names refer
to rights that are to be saved for the child until he is an adult, but which can
be violated ‘in advance,’ so to speak, before the child is even in a position to
exercise them.”).
132. See Millum, supra note 121, at 535–36.
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child will have Down syndrome), and that fact could inform the
pregnant woman’s reproductive choice in such a way that she
chooses to abort. If she chooses not to abort, accessing that part
of the fetal genome would not have violated an (future) adolescent right because Down syndrome is not a condition the child
born with it risks passing on to progeny. By contrast, fetal sequencing that reveals the fetus is merely the carrier of a recessive gene would arguably not be especially relevant to the
pregnant woman’s reproductive choices but would be important
to the reproductive choices of the adolescent into which the fetus may develop. Thus, regardless of whether the woman
chooses to abort, a facet of the fetal genome like carrier status
might reasonably be kept private from a pregnant woman
without unduly inhibiting her reproductive autonomy. While
there may be components of the child’s genomic information
that could be returned to parents because they reveal the parent’s own reproductive risks, there remain those results, such
as de novo mutations, that would never be relevant to parents’
reproductive choices.
This Part considered whether there are stronger reasons
not to return genomic reproductive choice information to minors than to return it. Concerns that this will cause unnecessary anxiety in adolescents have not yet been substantiated by
data. Further, it is possible to withhold some of this information in utero without unduly burdening the abortion right.
When added to the goals of decreasing the prevalence of birth
defects and reducing the liability clinicians face from neonatal
litigation, there are compelling reasons to structure a regime of
genomic healthcare to encourage individuals to know their reproductive choice information before they become sexually active. Doing this will require systemic, broad reforms as
healthcare turns to precision medicine and genomics. These reforms are achievable and are imperative to the goal of reducing
the prevalence of birth defects.
III. SECURING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN A GENOMIC
AGE
Part II explained why reform is needed to protect adolescent reproductive rights in a genomic age. As Feinberg’s analysis showed, this Note’s concern is only with adolescent rights
for indirect reasons. First, the appropriate time to know reproductive choice information is in adolescence, given statistics on
sexual initiation. Second, adolescent rights historically have re-
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ceived little protection, which will become a pronounced concern in a regime of genomic healthcare that seeks to protect reproductive choice information. On this analysis, it is general,
individual rights that merit protection, rights to make informed reproductive choices.
In Section A, this Part proposes conditions that will be important to secure in order to promote individual knowledge of
reproductive choice information. In Section B, the Part anticipates counterarguments that may be parried against the first
Section’s proposal. Finally, Section C offers a riposte to these
counterarguments that explains how the competing interests at
stake are best balanced.
A. PROMOTING CONDITIONS TO ACT ON REPRODUCTIVE
INFORMATION
This Section discusses the conditions necessary for promoting individual knowledge of reproductive choice information.
First, the Section will discuss reforms that will be necessary in
state abortion laws. Next, it will suggest reforms to clinical
guidelines. Finally, the Section will propose that discussions of
birth defects, genetics, and inheritance be incorporated into
state sex education curricula.
1. Reforms to Abortion Law and Policies
Abortion law and policies will necessitate change to secure
adolescent reproductive rights and promote a reduction in birth
defects. First, this Note endorses laws that not only allow but
use subsidy to promote the option of pre-viability termination
for abnormalities. Second, it also endorses subsidy as a means
of making abortion, contraception, and genetic testing meaningful options for all.
a. Ensuring Abortion Restrictions Contain Exceptions for Birth
Defects
Legal reforms should promote access to abortions for fetal
abnormalities, rather than criminalizing doctors who perform
them, as in North Dakota and Indiana. A decade before Roe,
several states began permitting abortions for genetic abnormalities after the drug thalidomide resulted in numerous cases of
birth defects, following the recommendations of the newly pub133
lished Model Penal Code. Additionally, the earliest ban on
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft
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motive-based abortions, a 1975 Illinois law, prohibited sexselective abortions but explicitly created an exception for sex134
linked chromosomal abnormalities.
135
North Dakota’s law, in contrast, which was informed by
136
model legislation from Americans United for Life, contains no
exception for genetic abnormalities. Nor does the Hyde
Amendment, under which an abortion to select against fetal
137
beabnormalities is not considered “medically necessary”
cause such abnormalities do not typically threaten the woman’s
life. In addition to such bans, anti-abortion efforts have pushed
mandatory requirements like ultrasounds and counseling prior
to an abortion as ways to burden the abortion right and protect
the state’s interest in fetal life. The attendant opportunity
costs, travel time, physical invasiveness, and other facets burden the abortion right in the name of informed consent and a
138
woman’s “right to know.” Not only should these bans be
struck down as violating the abortion right, there are also public health reasons to reject them since the effect of these laws is
to increase the prevalence of birth defects.

1962) (stating that if a fetus would have serious defects, abortion would be justified).
134. 720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 510/6(8) (1975).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013). For an article that extensively
discusses the constitutionality of North Dakota’s law, see Carole Peterson, Reproductive Justice, Public Policy, and Abortion on the Basis of Fetal Impairment: Lessons from International Human Rights Law and the Potential Impact
of the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 28 J.L. HEALTH 121
(2015).
136. North Dakota 2014 Report Card, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www
.aul.org/states/north-dakota (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). Describing itself as
“the legal architect and builder of the pro-life movement,” Americans United
for Life was formed in 1971, with its major objectives including ending all
abortions and reversing Roe. Issues, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul
.org/issue (last visited Aug. 15, 2015). It is currently active in most states, and
the organization claimed credit for twenty-four of the ninety-two abortion restriction laws that were passed in 2011. It was also the organization spearheading efforts in Virginia to require invasive ultrasounds before an abortion
could be performed, and also trying to shut down all abortion clinics in Kansas, among other efforts. Kate Sheppard, Wham, Bam, Sonogram! Meet the
Ladies Setting the New Pro-Life Agenda, MOTHER JONES, http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/americans-united-for-life-anti-abortion
-transvaginal-ultrasound (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
137. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980).
138. In Casey, the Court found the state’s informed consent requirement to
be unconstitutional as being merely “under the guise of securing informed consent,” failing to advance a legitimate state interest. Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 934 (1992) (emphasis added).
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b. Ensuring Meaningful Access to Abortion, Contraception,
and Genetic Testing
Instead of burdening the abortion right, a better approach
is to make reproductive choice information and reproductive
risk avoidance accessible options. Prior to its decision in Harris
v. McRae upholding the Hyde Amendment, the Supreme Court
had found constitutional a Connecticut law imposing abortion
payments on indigent women, stressing that “Connecticut’s
regulation is rationally related to and furthers the state’s legit139
imate interest in encouraging normal childbirth.” Though
abnormality-selective abortion bans and the Hyde Amendment’s bar on the use of Medicaid funds for such abortions may
promote a state’s interest in preventing the termination of fetal
life, they run contrary to the state’s interest in normal childbirth. In making reproductive risk avoidance more accessible,
the Strong Start for Mothers and Newborns Initiative of the
Department of Health and Human Services is an exemplar in
the right direction, funding nearly 200 sites with “enhanced
prenatal care approaches” to reduce premature births among
140
pregnant Medicaid or CHIP beneficiaries.
States should also look to California’s comprehensive regu141
lations to decrease birth defect risks. California administers a
statewide prenatal testing program offering ultrasound, amniocentesis, CVS, and testing for genetic disorders and birth de142
fects. To this end, the state administers a program of subsidy
grants for nonprofit prenatal diagnosis centers to offer such
143
services, and requires that testing at these centers be accom144
panied by genetic counseling. Overall, the program seeks to
educate clinicians and the public “concerning the uses of prena145
tal testing and the availability of the program,” and implements statewide postings where environmental can increase

139. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (emphasis added); see also id.
at 477–79 (repeating the emphasis on the state’s legitimate interest in the
normalcy of childbirth).
140. Strong Start for Mothers and Newborns Initiative: General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, https://innovation.cms.gov/
initiatives/Strong-Start/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125050–125119.5 (2015).
142. Id. § 125050.
143. Id. § 125055(e).
144. Id. § 125055(c).
145. Id. § 125055(b)(1).
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146

birth defect risks. These are all excellent ways to promote
knowledge of reproductive choice information.
2. Clinical Reforms To Promote Return of Reproductive Risks
Medical recommendations should be reformed to reflect the
liability that clinicians and others face from neonatal torts, and
to reflect the heightened legal protections accorded to an adolescent’s reproductive choice information. Both goals could be
furthered by directly and privately returning adolescents their
reproductive risks. If the child’s genome has already been sequenced, private return of results could involve withholding reproductive choice information until adolescence and then asking parents to step out of the room before results are disclosed.
In this way, clinical reforms could strengthen the adolescentphysician relationship.
3. Introducing Reproductive Risks into Sex Education
Public interests are best served by encouraging knowledge
of reproductive risks in early adolescence rather than waiting
until adulthood. Teaching individuals about reproductive risks
before the average individual is sexually active could be a rational, legitimate means through which to promote state interests in encouraging normal pregnancy outcomes, fewer unwanted pregnancies (those that result in birth defects), and
potentially fewer abortions (by encouraging individuals to
make pre-conception choices that decrease the prevalence of fetal abnormalities). There are clear differences between supporting choices not to conceive after learning of a reproductive risk
and choices to abort after testing reveals a fetal abnormality.
Both pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates are more likely to
147
coalesce over supporting the former.
Those with more conservative views on sex and reproduction may raise potential countervailing interests. These include
objections that public sex education in general is an implicit
stamp of approval on premarital sexual activity, that it should
only be taught in the home, or that it should promote absti148
nence as the best option. The incorporation of reproductive
risks into extant sex curricula, however, would be cautionary
146. Id. § 125055(b)(2)(A).
147. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Plan for Defeating PP – Education: Defeating Planned
Parenthood’s Public School Sex Education Programs, STOPP INT’L, http://www
.stopp.org/plan/E (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
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with regard to sex—not a scare tactic but a realistic presentation of birth defect risks faced by the general population and
149
subpopulations, as well as the attendant “moral hazard” of
sexual activity created by the possibility of birth defects. General education about these risks would not incline non-sexually
active individuals to initiate sexual activity, and it would encourage those who are sexually active to take into account information relevant for responsible sexual and reproductive
choices.
Further, public interests in efficient allocation of resources
are served by encouraging knowledge of reproductive risks. For
example, one could argue it costs taxpayers less money to use
public funds for abortion, since the alternative might be a
greater allocation of funds to support children who otherwise
150
would have been aborted. Public costs are multiplied several
fold if the child is born with a serious disorder for which ameliorative, intensive measures immediately after birth can be
taken. Costs are even higher than this when congenital impairments cannot be fully corrected, requiring neonatal care
151
and a lifetime of disability-related public entitlements.

149. Seana Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life,” Procreative Responsibility, and the
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 117–18, 137 (1999) (describing all
choices to procreate to be “morally hazardous” under liberal theory, since procreation involves imposing non-consensual harms on the person who comes
into existence); see also DAVID BENATAR, BETTER NEVER TO HAVE BEEN: THE
HARM OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE (2008) (arguing for the “anti-natal” view—
that it is always wrong to have children—and discussing how combining the
anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about fetal moral status yield a
“pro-death” view about abortion at the earlier stages of gestation); Seana
Shiffrin, Harm and Its Moral Significance, 18 LEGAL THEORY 357, 358 (2009)
(examining the definition of “harm” from birth defects in a legal and philosophical sense).
150. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 794
(Cal. 1981) (“[W]hatever money is saved by refusing to fund abortions will be
spent many times over in paying maternity care and childbirth expenses and
supporting the children of indigent mothers.”).
151. Grounding these public interests on cost savings is a delicate matter.
It may reasonably offend those living with disabilities if public cost savings is
a reason for encouraging fewer people with congenital birth defects from coming into existence. This Note has described return of reproductive risks as a
public health issue not because of the healthcare costs associated with birth
defects. Rather, by stressing the importance of returning genomic reproductive
choice information, this Note has emphasized the value of giving patients the
choice to know and act on such information, leaving it for them, rather than
states, to choose how to act in light of that information. See, e.g., Schneider,
supra note 81, at 141 (noting that participants “described how offering choice
is paramount to making genomic carrier screening ‘worth knowing’ since peo-
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Finally, public interests are served by policies that buttress
contraception and abortion as fundamental liberty rights,
rights to make one’s own decisions autonomously and not being
unduly burdened in making major life decisions, such as
whether or not to have a child. One author gives the example of
a woman in her mid-30s who finds her reproductive autonomy
constrained because she did not know about the increased risk
of infertility she would face because of her age; the lack of education on this front “constrains her ability to make a fully in152
formed choice about when to have children.” A lack of information and misinformation can similarly constrain adolescent
reproductive autonomy. For instance, many U.S. college-aged
women report that the lesson that they learned from their
school’s sex education was to “be safe and use protection” and
“use birth control so you don’t get pregnant,” which may contribute to a misperception that it is normal to have very high
153
fertility. In the case of reproductive risks, the current absence
of discussions about birth defects and genetic testing in public
sex education may give adolescents the misimpression that
those risks do not exist. In reality, ten to twenty percent of all
pregnancies result in abnormalities severe enough that the fe154
tus is miscarried, birth defects occur in one of thirty-three
155
births, and they are the leading cause of infant deaths.
With the goal of informing reproductive decisions when individuals start making them, this education should begin in
middle school, since a substantial amount of the population is
156
sexually active by then. The integration in recent years of user-friendly technologies like tablets into both the educational
and clinical spheres can support comprehension in early adolescence of key concepts like DNA and genetics. The Integrative
Genomics Viewer, for example, allows individuals who have
their genome sequenced to view the entire sequence on an iPad,
with interactive features enabling them to zoom in to particular
ple will bring their unique range of emotions, expectations, and prior experiences into their decision-making”).
152. Lucke, supra note 19, at 58.
153. Tanya L. Boone, Messages About Sexuality: An Ecological Perspective,
15 SEX, SEXUALITY & SOC’Y 437, 437 (2015).
154. Miscarriage, MAYO CLINIC (July 20, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/pregnancy-loss-miscarriage/basics/definition/con
-20033827.
155. Birth Defects, supra note 102.
156. Finer & Philbin, supra note 124, at 888 (stating that around 7.9 percent of adolescents have had sex by their fourteenth birthday).
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segments and variants, with explanations of their signifi157
cance.
In high school, the topic can further be incorporated into
classes in the natural sciences, especially through discussions
158
of inheritance in biology. Discussions of contraception and
abortion should be supplemented with discussions of genetic
and genomic testing, including carrier screening and prenatal
diagnosis. Other efforts could highlight the potential effects of
environmental toxins, tobacco, and alcohol use while pregnant,
as well as the benefit of prenatal vitamins. Reproductive risks
are almost entirely absent in most states’ sex education curric159
ula and in any federal sex-education “common core,” a lacuna
that this Note has argued will become palpable in a genomic
age.
B. ACCOMMODATING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
A variety of interest groups may object to the proposals
suggested in the first section of this Part. Objections may come
from anti-abortion, pro-choice, and disability rights interest
groups, as well as groups with conservative sexual values. This
Section briefly considers the counterarguments these interest
groups might marshal against a regime that promotes
knowledge of reproductive information.
1. Abortion-Related Objections
Anti-abortion objections only seem to apply inasmuch as
knowledge of reproductive choice information is associated with
contraception and abortion. Regarding contraception, consider
the Pope’s recent comment that, in the face of the risk of
microcephalic births, contraception may be the “lesser of two
160
evils.” More strenuous religious objections would likely focus
not on abstinence or birth control as ways of avoiding birth de161
fects, but rather on the use of abortion.
157. Helga Thorvaldsdóttir et al., A Genomic Data Viewer for iPad, 16 GEBIOLOGY 46 (2015) (explaining the Integrative Genomics Viewer app for
iPad).
158. E.g., Kassuba, supra note 18 (listing ideas of how to integrate information about genetic disorders in lesson plans).
159. See SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., GUIDELINES FOR
COMPREHENSIVE SEXUALITY EDUCATION: KINDERGARTEN – 12TH GRADE (3d
ed., 2004) (containing no content about reproductive risks).
160. Zika Virus: Pope Hints at Relaxation of Contraception Ban, BRITISH
BROAD. CORP. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-35608324.
161. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
NOME
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Pro-choice advocates may raise objections as well. Most notably, it is possible that public subsidies making abortion and
genetic testing more accessible could in some cases inhibit reproductive autonomy. Jennifer Denbow, for example, puts pressure on the distinction between reproductive choice and reproductive autonomy by noting the example of a woman who fears
162
abuse if she does not obtain an abortion. Tweaking Denbow’s
example to fit the context of subsidizing genetic testing options,
one might imagine a woman with an abusive partner who in no
circumstances wants a child born with serious impairments.
Such a hypothetical could be even more likely to lead to abuse
than the woman’s choice not to abort a healthy child. In short, a
personalized medicine culture in which genetic testing is widespread will increase reproductive choice, but this will not always thereby increase reproductive autonomy.
At least in the pre-conception context, one would anticipate
consensus between anti-abortion and pro-choice interest groups
on policies that encourage responsible pre-conception reproductive decisions, by increasing the availability of reproductive
choice information. Even in the post-conception context, recent
surveys support broad consensus for permitting abortions to select against serious defects; in a 2012 survey by the National
Opinion Research Council, 77.1 percent of people polled indicated they believed a woman should be able to obtain an abor163
tion “if there is a serious defect in the fetus,” while a Gallup
poll in the same year found that only forty-one percent of Amer164
icans identified as pro-choice. Thus there is good reason to
think legislative initiatives to provide public subsidy of prenatal testing options would garner broad public support across
party lines. Individuals will likely find this increase in repro165
ductive choices valuable, whether or not they utilize such options.

162. Jennifer Denbow, Abortion: When Choice and Autonomy Conflict, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 216, 217 (2005) (“[In] the extreme case of the
poor, abused, pregnant woman . . . the option to terminate her pregnancy can
act to undermine this woman’s autonomy . . . .”).
163. TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS ABORTION (2013), http://www.norc.org/pdfs/gss%20reports/trends%
20in%20attitudes%20about%20abortion_final.pdf.
164. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2016).
165. Schneider, supra note 81 (finding that participants in genetic screening found the experience valuable).
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2. Disability Rights Objections
The strongest case for increasing knowledge of reproductive risks is the avoidance of especially serious congenital conditions, such as those that are painful and lethal in early child166
hood. However, this creates a slippery slope. Microcephaly
may be accompanied by profound cognitive impairment, but
children with it typically can still experience over a decade of
167
life. Down syndrome is associated with cognitive impairment,
heart defects, and shortened lifespans, but according to one
frequently cited survey, those with the syndrome express a
168
high level of wellbeing and satisfaction with life. Further
166. Some wrongful life claims brought on behalf of infants born with such
conditions. See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunski, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1990) (“Adam
. . . will require special medical care throughout his life and will suffer substantial physical pain and mental anguish.”); Iafelice by Iafelice v. Zarafu, 534
A.2d 417, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (discussing an infant being born
with hydrocephalus, causing “interventricular hemorrhage and hydrocephalus
so that she now functions at the level of a four-month-old infant who will require permanent institutional care”); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla.
1987) (discussing an infant being born with hydrocephalus); Payne v. Myers,
743 P.2d 186, 187 (Utah 1987) (describing the syndrome as “a rare, genetically
transmitted, and progressively degenerative neurological disorder that is
characterized by widespread demyelination of the brain sheath, causing severe
motor disorders and eventually death”); Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp.
979 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (discussing how the plaintiff, Jennifer Gallagher, died
within three weeks of birth as a result of the defects from Trisomy 9); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Jeffrey Goldberg . . .
alleged . . . he ‘was born with Tay-Sachs disease and has suffered and will continue to suffer loss of motor function, loss of sensory function, blindness, deafness, pain, disability and numerous other injuries resulting in damages of a
personal, permanent and pecuniary nature and finally certain death.’”); Rubin
v. Hamot Med. Ctr., 478 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (discussing an infant
being born with Tay Sachs disease); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d
600, 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (describing plaintiff Desiree’s future prospects
as “a life of disease, sickness, and suffering”).
167. Imaizumi, supra note 11, at 133.
168. Brian G. Skotko et al., Self Perceptions from People with Down Syndrome, 155A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 2360 (2013); see also Brian Skotko, With
New Prenatal Testing, Will Babies with Down Syndrome Slowly Disappear?,
94 ARCH. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 823 (2009) (discussing the potentially decreasing incidence of babies born with Down Syndrome due to prenatal testing);
Monica Rafie & Tracy Winsor, How Can We Stop More Down Syndrome Babies
from Being Aborted?, LIFESITE (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.lifesitenews
.com/all/date/2011/12/16#article-how-can-we-stop-more-down-syndrome-babies
-from-being-aborted (citing heavily to Brian G. Skotko); Malcolm Ritter, Comfort or Conflict: Earlier Down Syndrome Test, WASH. TIMES (June 12, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/12/comfort-or-conflict-earlier
-down-syndrome-test (citing to Skotko as someone against disability-selective
abortions); Brian Skotko, Will America Cull People with Down Syndrome?,
USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
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congenital “impairments” could include late-onset conditions
like Huntington’s disease, or less severe conditions, like colorblindness or anosmia, the inability to smell. At some point, it is
unclear whether such a condition has sufficient normative salience to be considered a reproductive risk.
Normative salience and individual reproductive choices, in
turn, will largely be informed by the severity classification of
the congenital condition. This is borne out by two 2016 publications offering a reproductive decision aid for patients who un169
dergo preconception screening via genomic sequencing. In developing a taxonomy of birth defects, a taxonomy empirically
170
validated to reflect both patient and expert judgments, there
was ample disagreement regarding what conditions should be
171
classified as “serious.” As the authors conclude, “Determining
what conditions are described as ‘serious’ is complicated by the
subjectivity of the label and the potentially wide-ranging socie172
tal implications of that label.”
A particular risk created by the slippery slope of defining
severity is the expressive effect it may have on the community
of people living with disabilities. This is the sentiment evident
173
behind Indiana’s 2016 abnormality-selective abortion ban, as
174
well as behind failed 2015 legislative bills in Ohio and South
175
Dakota. Similarly, recommending to people that a child with
hereditary deafness is a “risk”—as seems implicit in newborn
aural screening tests routinized in every state—might smack of
176
ablism to the deaf community.
forum/story/2011-11-14/blood-test-downsyndrome/51202078/1 (discussing
Sequenom’s MaterniT21 test); Rebecca Taylor, 99% of Adults with Down Syndrome Report Being Happy in Life, LIFENEWS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www
.lifenews.com/2011/10/06/99-of-adults-with-down-syndrome-report-being
-happy-in-life (“The culture of death says, ‘Better dead than have Downs.’ But
99% of adults with Down Syndrome report they are happy with their lives . . . .
[T]he price of embracing the culture of death, of using death as a ‘medical
treatment’—it is quite literally the elimination of happiness.”).
169. Korngiebel et al., supra note 72.
170. Leo et al., supra note 72.
171. Id. at 579–80 (“Participants had difficulty distinguishing between
mild and serious medical problems . . . the appraisal of severity may be more
complex than we anticipated.”).
172. Korngiebel et al., supra note 72, at 566.
173. Tribune News Serv., supra note 36.
174. H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2015).
175. H.B. 1156, 90th Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2015).
176. A critique of ableism might stress that “disability” and “impairment”
are in large part socially constructed concepts. See, e.g., Ron Amundson, Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical Ethics, in QUALITY
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To mitigate this potential slippery slope, there should be
efforts to provide individuals and potential parents with accurate, unbiased information about reproductive risks. For example, a geneticist known for opposing selection against Down
177
syndrome contends that the obstetric view of the syndrome is
178
overall negative. One response to this concern can be seen in
179
180
181
Virginia,
Kentucky,
and Mislaws in Massachusetts,
182
souri, according to which health departments must provide
physicians with the most up-to-date information on life with
Down syndrome and treatment options. Doctors are encouraged
to give this information to all pregnant women who receive a
prenatal Down syndrome diagnosis. While the first three states
leave dissemination of this information optional, Missouri re183
quires doctors to provide it. Unbiased return of results is part
of the basic standard of care required of genetic counselors and
184
other clinical personnel. Holistic information can be a meaningful corrective to any coercive pressures the availability of
testing creates—pressures to avoid birth defects—and it can
help dispel inaccurate beliefs in the general public about life
with disabilities.
Thus this Note concludes that a genomic healthcare system
cannot escape problems of choosing which unknown variants to

OF LIFE AND
ABILITY 101,

HUMAN DIFFERENCE: GENETIC TESTING, HEALTHCARE, AND DIS101–24 (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005); Harlan Lane, Do
Deaf People Have a Disability?, 2 SIGN LANG. STUD. 356 (2002); Solveig
Reindal, Disability, Gene Therapy, and Eugenics–A Challenge to John Harris,
26 J. MED. ETHICS 89 (2000).
177. See supra note 168 (concerning specifically works written by author
Brian Skotko).
178. Brian Skotko, Prenatally Diagnosed Down Syndrome: Mothers Who
Continue Their Pregnancies Evaluate Their Health Providers, 192 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 670, 676 (2005).
179. MA. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 70H(b) (2016) (requiring up-to-date information and contact information on Down Syndrome resource centers).
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01(b) (2016) (requiring “up-to-date, scientific information”).
181. KY. REV. STAT. § 211.192 (2015) (requiring “up-to-date, evidence based
information”).
182. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923.1 (2015) (requiring “current information”).
183. Id. § 191.923.3 (2015) (“The physician . . . shall provide the patient
with current information.” (emphasis added)).
184. E.g., Vasantha Muthuswamy, Ethical Issues in Genetic Counselling
with Special Reference to Haemoglobinopathies, 134 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 547,
548 (2011) (“Nondirective counselling, a hallmark of the genetics profession, is
largely in accordance with the principle of respect for patient autonomy and
incorporates . . . other ethical principles as well.”).
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prioritize in research, which results should be returned to clinicians, and which ones should be returned to parents and adolescents. In making such choices, genomic healthcare will inevitably implicate concerns of the disabled community. This Note
has situated return of results in the context of the relationships
between adolescent, physician, and parent. In these contexts,
individuals have constitutionally protected rights to access contraception and abortion, and neonatal litigation has shown the
extent courts are willing to compensate plaintiffs when malpractice is the proximate cause of birth defects. We should not
ignore the threats to communities of people with disabilities
that could develop in a regime that more effectively sought to
eliminate birth defects, but nor should we capitulate in letting
those concerns stymie progress in reducing the prevalence of
birth defects.
CONCLUSION
Clinical genomics is a quickly burgeoning field, with collection of individual genomic data already occurring in the prenatal and early childhood contexts at the initiation of parents,
and further collection and return to parents likely soon to become routine through state-run newborn genomic screening
programs. Such a healthcare regime will necessitate regulatory
reform to protect the interests of adolescents, parents, women,
clinicians, and future children when sequencing reveals results
of reproductive significance.
This Note has endorsed state subsidy of options to increase
reproductive choice information, including newborn genomic
screening, sex education about birth defects, prenatal testing,
and individual pre-conception carrier screening via sequencing.
Stressing pre-conception knowledge of reproductive choice information can make options possible that reduce the prevalence
of birth defects, promotes reproductive autonomy, and seems
acceptable to anti-abortion interest groups. Their interests and
those of disability rights groups can be furthered by requiring
holistic, accurate information about life with birth defects to be
provided to women considering a post-abnormality-diagnosis
abortion.
The Note has stressed the values of reproductive autonomy
and of decreasing the prevalence of serious birth defects, which
implicitly suggests the value of neonatal litigation. That is, the
Note has defended the value of knowing reproductive choice information, such that individuals can have a legitimate claim

866

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:827

against clinicians for failing to disclose such information. Neonatal torts have received a hostile reaction from states, yet they
will be an important safeguard in a genomic age to ensure clinicians disclose reproductive choice information. There is some
traction to the claim that increased liability will induce providers to offer less testing, avoiding a potential source of liability.
However, this line of reasoning fails to account for the antecedent professional recommendations that clinicians should return
reproductive choice information; given those guidelines, a failure to offer testing itself would breach a clinician’s duty of care.
If neonatal causes of action are allowed in more jurisdictions,
courts should be cognizant that obstetricians already are subject to more liability than any other medical subfield (excepting
185
neurosurgery); coupled with the new role of genomics and the
complexity of understanding and conveying genomic results,
this should color expectations of what can reasonably be ex186
pected of clinicians.
Birth defect epidemics, from the thousands of infants born
187
with congenital rubella syndrome from 1962 to 1965, to the
thousands expected to be born with microcephaly in 2016 because of the Zika epidemic, raise public awareness of this
Note’s topic. But the risk of birth defects attends every pregnancy. Thus this Note has proposed structural reforms for the
impending regime of genomic healthcare to facilitate return of
reproductive choice information. The question of how to respond to the unfortunate reality of birth defects involves having
to balance incompatible anti-abortion, pro-choice, pro-parental,
and pro-disability interests. Yet rather than allowing this to
stymie progress in abortion politics, this Note has proffered a
modus vivendi that strikes a balance between these competing
interests in the service of making headway in decreasing the
prevalence of birth defects.
By increasing access to reproductive choice information, as
well as access to the reproductive technologies that allow one to
act on that information, states can thereby help create the con185. Adam S. Levine, The Best and Worst States for OB/GYN Practice: A
Professional Liability Perspective, CONTEMP. OB/GYN (Apr. 6, 2015), http://
contemporaryobgyn.modernmedicine.com/contemporary-obgyn/news/best-and
-worst-states-obgyn-practice-professional-liability-perspective-0.
186. The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology has suggested
there may be a shortage of 9000 to 14,000 obstetricians over the next twenty
years, in part, because of the cost of professional liability insurance, and because of a fear of being sued. Id.
187. RUBIN, supra note 13, at 21.
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ditions necessary for individuals to make informed reproductive
choices. The themes developed in this Note underlie important
facets that will continue to take form as the global community
seeks to halt Zika virus, however, since the birth defects are
not resultant from genetic variation, those issues are not peculiar to genomic healthcare. Still, genetic birth defects are not a
rare occurrence, and this Note has attempted to make initial
headway in anticipating and resolving some of the myriad issues they will pose in a genomic age.

